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THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
text-writers have attributed to the treaty-making powers 4 and the action of
Congress in asserting its ultimate intention of giving independence to the
Philippines,- indicates that territory outside of the States may be alienated.
Certainly no authority can be found denying the competence of the treaty-
making power to relinquish inchoate title to territory such as that to the Isle
of Pines. Numerous treaties have done just that thing. Every boundary
adjustment has meant the relinquishment of an inchoate claim. The Span-
ish treaty of 1819 relinquished a claim to Texas in exchange for Florida, and
the British treaty of 1846 relinquished a claim to Oregon up to fifty-four
forty. The Samoan treaty of 1899 (Article 2 paragraph 3) relinquished a
claim to half of those islands, and the mandate treaties of 1922-23 relin-
quished a claim to a fifth share in mandated areas. 26 A treaty approved by
the Senate on February 10, 1925, may result in relinquishing to the Nether-
lands a claim to the Island of Palmas south of the Philippines, a modus
vivendi of 1859 temporarily relinquished to Great Britain a claim to part of
San Juan Island in Vancouver Sound,'7 and a declaration attached to the
Danish treaty of 1916 relinquished any possible claim to Greenland. Many
of these claims have been of no legal value. The writer is not aware of any
grounds for claiming any part of Greenland, except those relied on by one of
the speakers at the Paris dinner party eloquently described by John Fiske.28
Some of them, however, were certainly as sound legally as our claim to the
Isle of Pines. In fact San Juan Island was eventually held to be American
territory by the arbitration of 1872; nevertheless the courts had supported
its temporary relinquishment by executive agreement.
29
QuINcy WRIGHT.
THE MEANING OF NATIONALITY IN THE RECENT IMMIGRATION ACTS
The regulation of immigration by determining a quota for each nationality
and excluding applicants for admission in excess of such quota was first
attempted in the Immigration Act of 1921,' which expired by limitation
that it should become a colony to some foreign state. There is no power in the Constitu-
tion to cede any part of the territories of the United States. The whole number of Congress,
being unanimous, have no power to suspend or cede territorial rights. But this amendment
admits, in the fullest latitude, that Congress have a right to dismember the empire." Elliott,
Debates, Vol. 3, pp. 602, 660. The context indicates that territorial claims of the States
was in Randolph's mind and the debate was on this question, !bi., pp. 499-50.
" Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267, 1890; Kent, Commentaries, Vol. 1, pp. 166, 176;
Wright, Control of American Foreign Relations, pp. 57, 121, 247-248; this JoURNAL, Vol.
13, pp. 248-251.
25 Act of August 29, 1916, 39 U. S. Stat. 545. 21 This JOURNAL, Vol. 18, p. 786.
i7 Crandall, Treaties, their making and Enforcement, p. 107; Wright, Control of American
Foreign Relations, p. 239.
28 Fske, "Manifest Destiny," American Political Ideas, p. 101.
2, Watts P. U. S., 1 Wash. Terr. 282,294,1870. '42 Statutes at Large, 5.
EDITORIAL COMMENT
last year, and has been continued in the more recent Immigration Act of
1924,2 now in effect. Until the more recent enactment the meaning of na-
tionality was obscured in a curious ambiguity.
The Act of 1921, Section 2, provided in part as follows:
(a) That the number of aliens of any nationality who may be ad-
mitted under the immigration laws to the United States in any fiscal
year shall be limited to 3 per centum of the number of foreign-born
persons of such nationality resident in the United States as determined
by the United States census of 1910 ...
(b) For the purposes of this Act nationality shall be determined by
country of birth, treating as separate countries the colonies or de-
pendencies for which separate enumeration was made in the United
States census of 1910.
(c) The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the
Secretary of Labor, jointly, shall, as soon as feasible after the enact-
ment of this Act, prepare a statement showing the number of persons
of the various nationalities resident in the United States as determined
by the United States census of 1910, which statement shall be the
population basis for the purposes of this Act.
Thus the Act of 1921 made nationality the basis of the quota plan. The
number of admissible aliens "of any nationality" was to be limited in each
fiscal year to a per centum of the foreign born persons "of such nationality"
resident in the United States according to the census of 1910. The state-
ment prepared to serve as the population basis was to show the number of
resident foreign-born persons "of the various nationalities" as determined
by the same census. Similar phraseology was used elsewhere in the statute.
Nationality was the basis, it would seem, upon which the statute was in-
tended to function.
Whether nationality was used in the scientific sense, however, meaning
the character created by allegiance to a recognized nation or state, or whether
its significance was arbitrary, referring only to such groupings as might be
arranged by census makers or other administrative officials, remained to
be determined by judicial construction. Such construction became essen-
tial as soon as it was attempted to apply the Act to immigration from cer-
tain of the smaller countries.
The census of 1910 made no separate enumeration for several of the
smaller countries, but lumped their nationals together under the heading
"other Europe" or "other Asia." The nationals of San Marino, for exam-
ple, were included under the heading "other Europe." It resulted that no
separate immigration quota could be allotted to the nationals of such coun-
tries. The Act of 1921 had to be taken either to have authorized one quota
for " other Europe" and another for "other Asia," notwithstanding the very
express provisions which placed the whole plan upon a nationality basis, or
to have left immigration from such countries unrestricted by the quota
scheme.
Federal Statutes Annotated, Pamphlet Supplement No. 38, July 1924, p. 34.
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Administrative authorities proceeded upon the assumption that there
should be one quota for "other Europe" and another for "other Asia."
This interpretation was approved by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit in the case of Pera v. White, 284 Fed. 699, and also by the
Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in United States v. Curran,
297 Fed. 219. In the former case, referring to the argument that nationality
was to be taken in the scientific sense, Judge Hunt remarked:
To adopt such a construction would be to overlook the larger and
expressed purpose of the legislation, which is to establish a limitation
upon the immigration aliens of any nationality, and in practical effect
would permit of unrestricted immigration of aliens from many coun-
tries where the census of 1910 made group enumerations.
In the latter case, it was said:
it makes no difference whether the census of 1910 [is accurate or inaccu-
rate, philosophical or unphilosophical, in its allocation of nationalities;
for the purposes of this statute what is here called "nationality" shall
be determined according to the views of the persons who compiled the
census referred to.
The interpretation rejected in the above cases appears to have been
approved, however, in Ex parte Haralampopoulos, 286 Fed. 432, decided by
the Federal District Court for the Massachusetts District, and it has been
accepted as the correct interpretation by the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in the recent case of Hughes v. United States, 1 Fed. (2d)
417. In the latter case immigration authorities had ordered deported some
nationals of San Marino upon the ground that the "other Europe" quota
had been exhausted. There had been, in fact, no immigrants from San
Marino during the month, but the quota had been used up by the admission
of immigrants from Gibraltar. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
orders which operated in effect to admit the petitioners to the United States.
Delivering the opinion of the court, Judge Morris said:
nowhere does the act provide for or permit an omnibus allotment for
separate and distinct countries. The act left the political status of the
countries of the world as it found it. The act created no new country
or nation. Nor did the census for 1910 do so. The grouping in that
census of the nationals, here resident, of several separate and distinct
countries under the caption "other Europe" served to create neither a
de jure nor a de facto country by that name.
Although the general purpose of the act was to limit immigration,
yet it made such purpose effective only as to the nationalities for which
a quota could be made and allotted under the terms of the act. The
immigration authorities were not empowered to supply intentional or
unintentional statutory omissions. Consequently . . . we think that
if San Marino is a separate and distinct political entity, and not a
colony or dependency of another nation, there was no legal ground for
the exclusion of the appellees, who were natives of that country. But
if, perchance, San Marino is not an wholly separate and independent
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political entity, it is an imperium in imperio, and in this sense a de-
pendency of Italy, by which it is completely surrounded .... And as
the Italian quota had not been exhausted for the month of September
at the time of the arrival of the appellees there was upon this hypothesis,
as upon the former, no legal ground for the exclusion of the appellees
who were born in San Marino.
It resulted from this diversity of interpretation of the Immigration Act
of 1921 that immigrants from several of the smaller countries of Europe and
Asia might enter the United States free from quota restrictions in Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Delaware, but not in New York,
Connecticut, or any of the states of the Pacific coast. Prospective immi-
grants, if well advised, probably selected their port of entry with due regard
to the effect of the decisions reviewed above. An interesting question
might have been raised with respect to the possible liability to deportation
of an immigrant from San Marino, for example, who had entered lawfully in
Pennsylvania and later migrated to New York or California where he would
have been excluded. 3
The intolerable situation thus created was amended by the Immigration
Act of 1924. The new Act provides, with respect to countries for which no
separate census enumeration has been made, that in preparing a statement
to serve as the population basis the three Secretaries shall jointly estimate,
for each of such countries, the number of their nationals who were resident
in continental United States when the census was taken and that the num-
ber thus estimated shall be considered "as having been determined by the
United States census." 4 In fixing quotas under the new "national origins"
plan, which is to become effective July 1, 1927, these countries will be in-
cluded in the list of those for which new data essential to the application of
a new principle are to be prepared. 5 Thus the Act of 1924 brings the small
countries excluded by the interpretation adopted in Hughes v. United
States, supra, expressly within the operation of the quota plan and at the
same time avoids attributing to nationality a meaning which is utterly
arbitrary.'
EDWIN D. DrcKINsoN.
' It would appear that this is still a question of practical importance for immigrants who
entered under the earlier Act, for the Act of 1924, in Section 30, provides: "Any alien who
prior to July 1, 1924, may have entered the United States in violation of such Act [Immi-
gration Act of 19211 or regulations made thereunder may be deported in the same manner as
if such Act had not expired."
4 See Section 12 (b).
5 See Section 11 (c).
6 See a valuable commentary upon the principal features of the new statute in articles
by A. Warner Parker in this JouRNAL, Vol. XVIH, No. 4, pp. 737-754, and Vol. XIX, No.
1, pp. 23-47.
